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ABSTRACT

Huang, Kaiyu Ph.D., Electrical Engineering Ph.D. program , Wright State University,
2019. High Security Cognitive Radio Network via Instantaneous Channel Information.

The cognitive radio network has been considered one of the most promising
communication technologies for next generation wireless communication. One important aspect of cognitive radio network research is the so-called Primary User Authentication. Naturally, the primary user authentication in the cognitive radio network requires strong encryption.
For the primary user identification, this dissertation provides a method
which hides the user information in the header of the data frames with an underlay
waveform. It is important to note that the underlay waveform will not bring redundancy data to the communication system. Using the synchronizing frequency as the
underlay waveform carrier also will not damage the system BER performance. The
simulation results show that the underlay waveform can be decoded correctly by the
receiver side with the cyclostationary signal processing, but can’t be detected by
conventional Fourier transform based signal detection algorithms.
This dissertation also suggests a keyless-encryption method which uses the
instantaneous channel information to enhance the anti-eavesdropping capability.
iii

This method is based on the wireless channel properties: the upstream parameters
are often times the same as the downstream parameters, and those parameters are
stable in a short period meanwhile varying in the long term at the slow fading channel. Those parameters are unique between the pair of the base station and the mobile terminal, and no third party has the ability to obtain them. The simulations results show that the method is able to provide exceptional encryption with excellent
BER performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND PROPOSAL

1.1 Evolution of Mobile Communication
Modern wireless communication system requires more and more bandwidth
to transfer higher data rates with the increasing number of users and growing of
high-speed data applications.
The first generation (1G) of the wireless communication network (1980s1990s) only provided voice calls. It was the analog system with frequency division
multiple access (FDMA) technique. Since it was designed as a “mobile telephone”
system which only needs to transmit the human voice within 3KHz bandwidth, and
no digital data transfer required, the single channel’s bandwidth is pretty small [1].
This communication system has no data encryption at all. People can use an FM radio to listen to the users’ conversations.
The second generation (2G) of the wireless communication network (1990s2000s) is based on the Global System for Mobile communications (GSM). It was a
digital communication system which transmitted the voice information by digital
signals, and could also deliver a text message or multimedia message. The data rate
was about a few Kbps. In this 2G category, 2.5G (General Packet Radio Service, GPRS,
40Kbps in practice) and 2.75G (Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution EDGE,
1

500Kbps in practice) network were developed which increased the data speed to a
couple of hundred kbps [2].
The third generation (3G) wireless communication network (2000s-2010s)
included CDMA2000, WCDMA, and TD-CDMA. This generation provided a higher data rate to a single user up to 2Mbps, which was much faster than the 2G. People
could download multimedia information based on this technique by smart cell
phone, but the speed was low.
The fourth generation (4G) wireless communication network (2010s-now)
provides data rate from 100Mbps (mobile) to 1Gbps (stationary) based on the Long
Term Evolution (LTE) standard. In this network, people can do video calls, play
games online, watch videos, and surf on the internet freely by the user equipment
(UE) just as a computer through the Ethernet cable.
The fifth generation (5G) wireless communication network should provide
higher data rate than 1Gbps (target peak data rate 20 Gbps) [3][4] [5], and the world
first 5G service was set at South Korea by SK Telecom on 1 December 2018 [6].

Table 1: Max Data Rate of Different Generations

Generations

Max Data(Information) Rate

1G

3KHz

2G

500Kbps

3G

2Mbps

4G

1Gbps

5G

20Gbps

2

1.2 Bandwidth Limitation
From Table 1 we can find that the data rate increases rapidly with the communication network upgrading. In theory, the wireless bandwidth can be infinite
due to the uncapped wireless frequency. However, for some environments only
some special wireless band can be used, also the maximum frequency we can use is
limited by our technology. Therefore, the spectrum can be used for wireless communication is quite limited. From the United States Frequency Allocations: The Radio
Spectrum Chart (Figure 1) released in January 2016 by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), U.S. Department of Commerce [7], the
radio spectrum from 9KHz to 300GHz all have been allocated.

Figure 1: The Radio Spectrum Chart

How to use the limited spectrum more efficiently is a problem we need to face.
3

1.3 Cognitive Radio for Spectrum Efficiency Improvement
By analyzing the usage of the spectrum, we can find that not all radio spectrum bands are being used at all times even though they have been allocated, leading
to so-called “spectrum holes” [8] as Figure 2. Taking advantage of these spectrum
holes to efficiently transmit information through a so-called cognitive radio network
may be one of the solutions for the spectrum congestion problem. It has been considered as one of the most promising communication technologies for next generation wireless communication [9].

Figure 2: “Spectrum Holes” for Cognitive User

Cognitive Radio (CR) is defined as “a form of dynamic spectrum management”
[10]. It has been developed for years [11] and can be achieved easily by software de-

4

fined radio[12]. A typical Cognitive Radio network topology with manage center
mentioned by H. Mehta [13] can be described as Figure 3:

Figure 3: Cognitive Radio Architecture
The manage center, e.g. the spectrum broker, should be able to monitor preset channels to see if any channels are available; it also can identify which channels
are used by the Primary User (PU, a sub-network includes Base Station, BS, and User
Equipment, UEs. It also can just be a transmitter and a receiver pair. ) or the Licensed User (LU), which channels are used by the Secondary User (SU, a subnetwork also includes BS and UEs. It also can just be a transmitter and a receiver
pair.) or the Cognitive User (CUs). The primary user is the legitimate user with a
higher priority to use the channel. The secondary user can be considered as the op5

portunistic user to use the “spectrum holes” only when the primary user is not present and must quit the channel whenever the primary user is back; the secondary
user should not cause interference to the primary user, instead the secondary user
needs to cooperate with the primary user.
The manage center should be able to automatically switch to the best wireless channels dynamically to avoid spectrum congestion for both PUs and SUs. When
the PU is offline and a “spectrum hole” is present, the spectrum broker will allow a
SU to use the “spectrum hole” which is licensed to the PU. When the PU is back while
the SU is using the spectrum band, the spectrum broker will ask this SU to leave the
spectrum band to avoid interference to the PU.

1.4 Problems for the Cognitive Radio Network
Compared with traditional wireless networks, the cognitive radio network
has a major issue called the primary user authentication problem: 1) The manage
center should be able to identify that the primary user is back, or just a SU is using
the spectrum band; 2) also in the case of primary user being present, the manage
center should be able to judge that the “primary user” is the real primary user to
avoid the Primary-User-Emulation (PUE) attack [14][15][16].
An intruder may pretend to be the primary user, impersonating a PU by
mimicking distinctive PU’s characteristics and features, to attack the secondary user
who is using the spectrum band, as illustrated in Figure 4. Even worse, this kind of
attack may affect the real primary user’s right to use the spectrum. So, in the process

6

of authentication, the primary user’s communication with the certification center
must be highly encrypted.

Figure 4: PUE Attack

1.5 System Structure Assumptions
In this dissertation, our discussion is based on the digital wireless communication system. In the system, all communications are using the M-QSK or the M-QAM
modulations. A single user may use a single channel or may have a set of subchannels to perform the communication. If in the situation there is a set of subchannels, we process each sub-channel as a single independent channel.

7

We assume the cognitive radio system has the same structure as what we
mentioned in section 1.3. The system has the primary users, the secondary users,
and the spectrum broker (identification center).
We also assume that the system may be under the Primary Users Emulation
(PUE) Attack by an “intruder” as described in section 1.4. The “intruder”, who tries
to interfere and occupy the vacant spectrum of the PU intended for SU, impersonates
the PU by mimicking PU’s distinctive characteristics and features. In this case, the
identification center assumes the PU is back and asks the SU to quit the spectrum for
the “intruder”.

1.6 Proposal
There are plenty methods published which try to fight against the PUE attack,
but most of them will change the PU’s physical layer [17]-[21] or need extra bandwidth to identify the PU.
In this dissertation, unlike existing methods in the literature, we are going to
design a brand new scheme against PUE attack without the drawbacks of existing
methods. Specifically, we will design a two-level protection for the cognitive radio
network against the PUE attack. Our method does not require the Physical Layer parameters of the PU to be changed, and we don’t require extra bandwidth.
The first level is to use an underlay waveform to add a “fingerprint” to PU’s
characteristics. Whenever the PU is online, it should automatically broadcast those
characteristics, to let the certification center recognize its legitimacy.

8

If the PUE attack happens or the certification center believes the authentication is necessary, the second level protection and the highly encrypted wireless
channel for point-to-point communication need to be applied.
The second level protection is the core of our proposed technologies.

1.6.1 PU’s Characteristics Design
A well designed PU’s characteristics can reduce the risk of the PUE attack
meanwhile not affect normal communication:
1) The PU’s characteristics should be always present whenever the PU is using the spectrum. Whenever the signal hasn’t the PU’s characteristics, it
isn’t the PU.
2) The PU’s characteristics should be transparent to the UEs in the PU subnetwork.
3) The PU’s characteristics should not ask extra the spectrum bandwidth.
4) The PU’s characteristics should be hidden and can be easily changed under
the requirement from the identification center.

1.6.2 Anti-Eavesdropping
Essentially, the wireless communication is a “broadcast” system due to the
nature of the transmission of electromagnetic waves, and all information can be
monitored, recorded, and analyzed by any receiver in the area. If any characteristics
information is broadcast, it may be learned gradually by the receiver, so none of the
PU’s characteristics design can guarantee to avoid the PUE attack problem entirely.

9

When the PUE attack is happening, or the identification center suspects the
PUE attack is happening, the identification center can use the highly encrypted
method to communicate with the “PU” to perform authentication, and ask the PU to
modify its characteristics. This kind of authentication must be eavesdropping-free.
To design a method against the eavesdropping meanwhile to keep a good communication performance in the wireless system is the most challenging due to its “broadcast” property.

10

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Before we try to solve the problems, here we review some knowledge which
will be used in this dissertation.

2.1 Fourier Transform
For the spectrum band occupancy detection, the traditional method is based
on the power spectrum analysis via Fourier Transform [22]. People monitor the
wireless channel and apply the Fourier Transform on the auto-correlation function
of the received signal.
Fourier Transform is defined as
̂( )

∫

Equation
1

( )

where ( ) is an integrable function.
The power spectral density function of ( ) is defined as
( )

and

∫

Equation
2

( )

( ) is the autocorrelation function of ( )
11

( )

∫

( ) (

Equation
3

)

The following figure is an example of power spectrum analysis results. It
shows a high power around the 17KHz, and indeed the signal is a BPSK modulated
sinusoid with a carrier frequency at

, and a symbol rate at

,

.

Figure 5: Power Spectrum of a BPSK Signal
This is a mature algorithm, and easy to apply. For example, M.K. Kaushik, etc.
developed a peak excursion threshold method which could detect if a spectrum
channel of the cognitive radio were used or not [23]; A. Fanan, etc. proved that the
low-cost software defined radio RTL-SDR (Realtek-based Software Defined Radio)
12

could offer similar performance as the conventional spectrum analyzer in the spectrum occupancy measurement area [24]. However, those methods can only see if
there is something on this spectrum or not [25] [26]. The Fourier Transformation
method has difficulty to obtain important RF parameters (e.g., center frequency,
bandwidth, the modulation information) accurately, especially when multiple signal
components are mixed together with significant overlap in the frequency domain.
By employing the software defined radio, we can verify the performance of the FFT
algorithm for the mixed signals detection. Figure 6 shows the wireless TX and RX
system.

Figure 6: The Software-Defined Radio TX/RX System
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Figure 7: Example Configure of the TX

Figure 8: FFT Result of Mixed Two BPSK Signals
14

Figure 7 and Figure 8 show that for a mixed signal with 2 signal components, the
FFT algorithm can detect the signals, but is unable to separate those 2 signal components.

2.2 Cyclostationary Analysis
Cyclostationary analysis [27][28] also can be used to detect the signals. Here
we introduce the second order cyclostationary analysis:
Assume ( ) is a cyclostationary signal, its correlation function is
(

)

(

) (

Equation
4

)

And the Fourier coefficients are
⁄

( )

∫

(

Equation
5

)

⁄

where

⁄ is the cyclic frequency, and

( ) is the cyclic autocorrelation func-

tion.
( ) is the

The Fourier transformation of cyclic autocorrelation function
Spectral Correlation Function (SCF):
( )

∫

Equation
6

( )

It can be used to detect the existence of the signal, estimate its carrier frequency and symbol rate, and even detect its modulation type [24]-[35].
The SCF result of the same BPSK modulated signal (
is shown here (3D plot. Frequency, , and the amplitude):
15

,

.)

Figure 9: A SCF 3D View of a BPSK Signal
Particularly, this method is applicable to detect mixed signals [36]-[42]. For
example, the SCF analysis results of the mixed signal with 2 signal components in
Figure 7 are shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 (accumulation results through

view,

based on Figure 10). From Figure 11, we can clearly identify those two signal components with two different symbol rates.
The FFT generates a two-dimension result, while the SCF generates a threedimensional result due to the additional freedom of . Based on this newly introduced freedom, it’s understandable that the SCF analysis algorithm is much more
complex compared with the FFT.

16

Figure 10: 3D View of Mixed Two BPSK Signals

Figure 11: Frequency Integration of SCF, Mixed Two BPSK Signals
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2.3 Constellation and Gray Code
For a digital communication system, we need to define the constellation for
the digitally modulated symbols. In this dissertation, we are going to use the following constellations for different modulations.

2.3.1 BPSK
The signal space of the BPSK is {0, 1}, so the constellation of it is simply
shown in the follow figure:

Figure 12: BPSK Constellation
18

2.3.2 QPSK
The signal space of the QPSK modulation (or 4-QAM) is {00, 01, 10, 11}, and
the constellation of it is shown in the follow figure:

Figure 13: QPSK Constellation

2.3.3 8PSK
The signal space of the 8PSK modulation is {000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110,
111}, and the constellation of it is shown in the follow figure:

19

Figure 14: 8PSK Constellation

2.3.4 16-QAM
The signal space of the 16-QAM modulation is {0000, 0001, 0010, 0011, 0100,
0101, 0110, 0111, 1000, 1001, 1010, 1011, 1100, 1101, 1110, 1111}, and the constellation of it is shown in the follow figure:
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Figure 15: 16-QAM Constellation
In this constellation, we applied the Gray Coding [43]. The benefit of the Gray
Coding is that for each constellation point, it has only one bit difference to its neighbors. At the receiver side, if there is a receiving error happened, it most likely will
only cause one bit error, leading to minimized BER.

2.3.5 64-QAM
The signal space of the 64QAM modulation is the 6 bit combination ranging
from (000000) to (111111) which includes 64 elements, and the constellation of it is
shown in the follow figure:
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Figure 16: 64-QAM Constellation
Same as 16-QAM, we have applied the Gray Coding in this 64-QAM constellation.

2.4 Additive White Gaussian Noise Channel
Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) [44] is the basic noise model used in
the communication system. “Additive” means that this noise is added to the transmitted signals in the math model. “White” means that this noise has the uniform
power spectral density at all frequencies. “Gaussian” means that this noise has the
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Gaussian distribution ( (
iance of

)) in its amplitude, with zero mean (

), and a var-

which is associated with the noise power.

The Possibility Density Function (PDF) of the Gaussian distribution is
(

(

)

)

Equation
7

√

Figure 17: Gaussian Distribution (PDF)
Some properties of the Gaussian distribution will be applied in this dissertation [45]:
(

)

(

and
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)

(

)

Equation
8

(
where the (

)

(

Equation
9

)

) is independent to the (

), and the

denotes a

constant.
The following figure shows the QPSK, 8PSK, and 16QAM modulation signals’
Bit Error Rate (BER) vs. Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) performance in the AWGN
channel.

Figure 18: QPSK, 8PSK, and 16QAM Modulation BER vs. SNR Performance
in AWGN Channel
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2.5 Rayleigh Fading
In this dissertation, Rayleigh fading [46] is used to characterize the wireless
fading channel.
The statistical Rayleigh fading model is commonly used in wireless communication to model the channel effect, which is caused by the multipath reception. According to the Rayleigh distribution [45][46], the Rayleigh fading has the magnitude
distribution that is the same as the radial component distribution of the sum of two
uncorrelated Gaussian random variables.
The PDF of the Rayleigh distribution is

(

Equation
10

)

Figure 19: Rayleigh Distribution (PDF),
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The Rayleigh fading can be written as
( )
where

( )

Equation 11

is the channel amplitude-attenuation which follows the Rayleigh distribu-

tion (see Figure 19) with the scale parameter , and

is the channel phase shift

which follows the uniform distribution between

).

In this dissertation, all scale parameters in the simulations are set to

√ which

will not change the signal’s power, and hold the SNR as it is.
The Rayleigh fading will seriously damage the BER performance compared
with the AWGN channel performance. At the high SNR situation, the system’s BER is
dominated by the Rayleigh fading effect [47].

Figure 20: QPSK, 8PSK, and 16QAM Modulation BER vs. SNR Performance in
AWGN Channel and in Rayleigh Fading Channel.
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Figure 20 shows that at the same SNR situation with the same modulations,
the BER in the Rayleigh fading channel is significantly worse than that of a pure
AWGN channel.

2.6 Channel State Information (CSI)
In this dissertation, the following wireless communication channel characteristics
are considered:
1) Wireless Channel Reciprocity.
For some wireless channels, the fading of the uplink is the same as the downlink at
any given time [48][49].
2) Instantaneous CSI [49]
The channel’s Instantaneous CSI can be estimated on a short-term basis, by the
training sequence (or the pilot sequence).
3) Statistical CSI (or long-term CSI) [49]
The channel’s statistical characterization of the channel can be known, e.g., the type
of fading.
Also, essentially the Rayleigh fading is caused by the multipath effect, which
means that any different position pairs will have different instantaneous CSI, and no
any third position can duplicate the same instantaneous CSI.
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2.7 Encryption
Encryption is a method that an encoded message can only be decoded correctly by the authorized parties, not by un-authorized parties [50].

Figure 21: Same Key for Encryption and Decryption

Figure 22: Encryption Key Different to Decryption Key
For the encryption of the wireless communication system, the typical way is
similar as the wired communication system: A and B negotiate the encryption algorithm (usually published in the protocol) and the key (original). The key which is
used during the communication may be the original one, or a derived one from the
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original one (seed). B decrypts the cipher text which has been encrypted by A with
the key with the correlated algorithm [51]. For example, in Figure 21 (symmetric
encryption algorithm), both encryption and decryption sides are using the same key;
and in Figure 22 (asymmetric encryption system), the public key which is used at
the encryption side is different to the secret key at the decryption side.
Since the encryption algorithm is published in the protocol, there is a possibility to be decrypted by ‘guessing the key’ with more and more powerful computation ability of modern computers. In the worst case, if the original key was stolen
(e.g. hacker’s attack, or eavesdropper’s interception), the encryption will fail.
In theory, a perfect encryption system should satisfy the following properties:
1) The key should be a truly random code.
2) The key should have infinite length, or in other words, the key should have
at least the same length as the message, e.g. the one-time pad (OTP) [52].
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3. PU CHARACTERISTICS DESIGN

As what we have mentioned in the proposal section, a good design of the PU’s
characteristics should have the following properties:
1) The PU’s characteristics should be always present whenever the PU is using the spectrum. Whenever the signal does not exhibit the PU’s characteristics, it isn’t the PU.
2) The PU’s characteristics should be transparent to the UEs in the PU subnetwork.
3) The PU’s characteristics should not ask for extra bandwidth.
4) The PU’s characteristics should be hidden, and can be easily changed under the requirement from the identification center.

3.1 Potential Solution: Overlay/Underlay Waveform
V. Chakravarthy et al. proposed a hybrid overlay/underlay (UL) waveform
[53]-[57] method for communication to enhance the spectrum access, as Figure 23
shows. For this method, the secondary user might use the combination of overlay
and underlay waveforms together to transmit messages without disturbing the PU’s
communication.
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Figure 23: Underlay User for Cognitive Radio
This method was designed to use the spectrum more efficiently. Here we
propose to use the underlay waveform to carry the PU’s characteristics. As Figure 24
shows, the real PU has an underlay portion which carries some information for identification; if the PUE does not contain these characteristics, the identification center
can easily catch it as the “intruder”.

Figure 24: Underlay as the PU’s Characteristic
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In this method, in the PU sub-system, the UEs do not need to do any change to
adapt. Since the underlay waveform has very low power spectral density compared
with the overlay waveform, the whole signal would look normal as the signal without the UL, or maybe a little higher “noise background”.
We can further enhance the performance by considering the following:
1) The underlay waveform will increase the “noise background” to the PU,
which will decrease the PU system’s SNR.
2) The underlay signal is low, and is using the same spectrum band as the
overlay, which will be difficult for any un-authorized parties to decode it.
However, it will also be difficult for the identification center to detect its existence. The high power overlay signal might overshadow the low power underlay signal.

3.2 Optimal Underlay Waveform for PU’s Characteristics Design
In traditional wireless networks, the data package usually has a header part,
which includes channel estimation, synchronization, control, and other information.
For example, the WIFI protocol 802.11a/g has the following structure shown in Figure 25 [58].
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Figure 25: An Example Data Frame Header from Wi-Fi Protocol
By inspecting this structure, we can find that the STF and the LTF in the preamble part do not include any important user information. If we only apply the underlay with the STF and the LTF, it will not increase the “noise background” of the
user data part. Also, the STF and the LTF are used as frequency synchronization,
which means it is a certain signal known by both the transmitter and the receiver.
We can apply the underlay with the STF/LTF part at the transmitter side. At the receiver side, if we remove the “known STF/LTF” from the received header, the underlay will be exposed. In this case, the underlay can be much easier to be identified
without being “overshadowed” by the strong power STF/LTF.
Combining with the SCF technique we mentioned in section 2.2, we can set
the underlay waveform as a BPSK signal with a certain symbol rate, and use the
symbol rate as the PU’s characteristics. The PU put the underlay in its data header,
then the identification center tries to extract the underlay from the data header. If
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the identification center can detect this unique characteristic (the underlay symbol
rate), we can assume that the PU is online [59].

Figure 26: PU Structure: (Header Signal + Underlay Signal) with User’s Data Payload

3.3 Simulation Results
We use the MATLAB to perform the numerical simulation.
In this simulation, we generate the signals including the user data, and the
header (the header has underlay with it), after a AWGN channel, at the receiver side
we cut off the user data part, remove the header data (which is known by protocol),
and perform SCF analysis.
We set the carrier frequency as

, and the symbol rate at

. The SNR of the PU signal is 1
The underlay signal has the same

.
, but with different symbol rate at

. The power of it is at SNR=-10dB, which means the PU signal power is
20dB higher than the underlay signal power.
The simulation results are shown from Figure 27 to Figure 30.
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Figure 27 is a package of the PU data. It includes the header and the user
message.

Figure 27: A BPSK Signal Package with a Header
Figure 28 and Figure 29 are the comparison between the original PU signal
and the PU signal + Underlay signal in the time domain. They are very similar so a
simple time domain processing would not reveal the difference.
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Figure 28: The BPSK Signal after an AWGN Channel

Figure 29: The BPSK Signal with an Underlay Header after an AWGN Channel
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Figure 30 and Figure 31 show the comparison between the original PU signal
and Underlay signal in the frequency domain. No frequency feature is exhibited here
either.

Figure 30: FFT Result of the BPSK Signal after an AWGN Channel

Figure 31: FFT Result of the BPSK Signal with an Underlay Header after an
AWGN Channel
37

Figure 32 and Figure 33 show the comparison between the original PU signal
and the PU signal + Underlay signal in the cyclostationary domain through SCF.

Figure 32: The SCF 3D view of the BPSK Signal after an AWGN Channel

Figure 33: the SCF 3D view of the BPSK signal with an Underlay Header after an
AWGN Channel
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Figure 34 and Figure 35 present the comparison between the original PU signal and the PU signal + Underlay signal in the cyclostationary domain via sum results along the α axis. No characteristics are revealed here either.

Figure 34: Sum of α: the BPSK Signal after an AWGN Channel

Figure 35: Sum of α: the BPSK Signal with an Underlay Header after an AWGN
Channel
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But if we subtract the header information from the header, and only keep the
underlay signal with the noise, the underlay signal will be exposed.
Figure 36 to Figure 37 show the SCF results of the Underlay signal, and Figure 38 is a
zoom-in view of Figure 37.

Figure 36: the SCF 3D View of the Underlay Header Part
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Figure 37: Sum of α: the Underlay Header Part

Figure 38: Sum of α, Zoom in: the Underlay Header Part
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From Figure 38, the underlay signal with 7 kHz symbol rate is identified after
the SCF processing. Another unmarked peak occurs at 26 kHz which is twice of the
carrier frequency as expected.
The symbol rate can be configured by the PU. It can be a sequence set by the
identification center during the authentication process which will increase the security of the system.
Compared with the FFT algorithm, the SCF algorithm requires strong computation ability to obtain real-time output. This will not be a critical problem, since the
spectrum broker, or the identification center has virtually unlimited power to do it;
but this may be a problem for the “mobile intruders” which are powered by the battery to analyze and extract the underlay information.
Recall the target PU characteristics we are going to design at the beginning of
this chapter, this method that adds the underlay waveform in the header structure
can be used to carry the PU’s characteristics.
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4. ANTI-EAVESDROPPING

In our proposed cognitive radio system, the PU’s Characteristics is used as
the first level identification, which will not interrupt the PU’s communication, and
can monitor the presence of the PU. If the identification center suspects that the
spectrum band user may not be the legitimate PU, it can initiate an authentication
process. During this process, the identification center may ask the PU (or the Base
Station in our Figure 4) to provide more information, and reconfigure the PU characteristics. This authentication process must be highly encrypted, and should never be
decoded by any third party. Also, this process expects a kind of “large” amount data
exchanging between the PU and the identification center, so the underlay waveform
method in previous section cannot handle it.
In other words, we need to find an excellent anti-eavesdropping algorithm for
the system. Here, we assume some additional properties for the wireless channels
beside the properties described in section 2.5:
1) Channel Estimation: The wireless system is always using pilot signal to estimate the wireless channel, and during each estimation period for both uplink and downlink, the instantaneous CSI parameter is unchanged.
2) Noise: Only the Additive White Gaussian Noise is applied to the channel.
3) Fading: The fading model is the Rayleigh fading.
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4.1 Potential Solution: Encryption by Wireless
Channel Information
H. Li et al. developed an encryption method (using channel phase-sifting information as the key, no key pre-determined) for the wireless communication system [60]. The logic can be described as follows:
1), Legitimate Receiver sends the pilot signal;
2), Transmitter estimates the channel's fading with the pilot signal from step
1);
3), Transmitter maps the data to the symbol of the constellation;
4), Transmitter checks the estimation result in step 2), if the channel phase
shifting is larger than π, perform an interleaving of the symbol (switch the
real part and imaginary part) from step 3), otherwise not;
5), Transmitter sends the pilot signal, and sends the symbol in step 4);
6), Legitimate Receiver estimates the channel's fading with the pilot signal
from step 5);
7), Legitimate Receiver checks the estimation result in step 6), if the phase
shift is larger than π, perform an anti-interleaving for the received symbol
from step 5);
8), Legitimate Receiver decodes the data from step 7).
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Figure 39: Interleaving Data by Channel’s Phase Shifting
Recalling the wireless channel’s properties in section 2.5, the channel’s CSI
information is identical between the uplink and the downlink at any given time –
which means that the transmitter and the receiver are able to obtain the same channel information at any given time; due to the multipath effect, no any third parties
can obtain the same channel information; the instantaneous CSI can be estimated,
and in the long term it’s changed with time.
By analyzing the encryption/decryption algorithm, we can find that this
method meets the encryption requirements described in section 2.7: the key should
be a real random code, infinite code length or can be as long as the message length.
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However, there is a critical defect of this method. This algorithm will cause
significant system BER/SER performance degradation.
Figure 40 shows the BER vs. SNR performance of Li’s method. The modulation is a QPSK. We assume the system is an OFDMA system, which has 48 subchannels. The “*” marked lines indicate the legitimate user side system performance,
and the “□” marked lines indicate the eavesdropper side system performance. Different colors indicate different “M”, where “M” means how many sub-channels out of
the total sub-channels are encrypted by this method. For example, “M=8” means for
total 48 sub-channels, only 8 sub-channels are encrypted. It’s simulated by MATLAB,
with the logic present at the beginning of this section.

Figure 40: System Performance by Li’s Method
When all channels are encrypted by this method, the system BER/SER performance has 20dB degradation compared with the un-encrypted system when the
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SNR=45dB. Even taking advantage of the partial-channel-encryption with M=8 over
48, the system BER/SER performance is still 11dB worse than the un-encrypted system while SNR=45dB. Also, from the tendency of the Figure 40 we can expect that
the gap of the performances between the encrypted system and the un-encrypted
system will become wider with the system SNR increasing.

4.2 Extension and Explore for Li’s Method
Li’s method involves the un-encrypted channels in his simulations which will
take advantage when we consider the BER vs. SNR performance. The core of his
method is the interleaving based on the channel’s phase-shifting. To fully evaluate
this encryption method, all sub-channels are interleaved in our discussion.

4.2.1 More Slices
First we are going to increase the interleaving rate. In Li’s algorithm, he splits
the phase shifting domain into 2 parts, [0, π), and [π, 2π). Here we simulate the scenarios which the phase shifting domain split to 2 parts (each part occupies 180 degree), 4 parts (each part occupies 90 degree, as the Figure 41 as an example), 8 parts
(each part occupies 45 degree), and 16 parts (each part occupies 22.5 degree); in
half of the total parts we will perform data interleaving, in the other half we do not.
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Figure 41: Split to 4 Parties.
The modulation methods include the QPSK, and 16-QAM.
The QPSK simulation results are shown in Figure 42. From the curves it is evident that the error rate increases with the split part number.
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Figure 42: QPSK Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted with Different Phase Split Part Number
Table 2 shows that at the same SNR situation, the BER is linearly increasing
with the split part number.

Table 2: QPSK Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted with Different
Phase Split Part Number

SNR(dB)

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

BER: 2-split

0.26804

0.16291

0.09088

0.04911

0.02608

0.01457

0.00820

0.004523

0.002537

BER: 4-split

0.35439

0.24256

0.15100

0.08731

0.04910

0.02801

0.01578

0.009002

0.005056

BER: 8-split

0.45407

0.36462

0.25341

0.15770

0.09305

0.05436

0.03107

0.017871

0.010074

BER: 16-split

0.49777

0.46985

0.38842

0.27503

0.17402

0.10497

0.06104

0.035213

0.019983
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The 16-QAM simulation results are shown in Figure 43, and some important
values are listed in Table 3. They show the same tendency as the QPSK.

Figure 43: 16-QAM Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted with Different Phase Split Part Number
Table 3: 16-QAM Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted with Different Phase Split Part Number

SNR(dB)

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

BER: 2-split

0.27192

0.16947

0.08790

0.03981

0.01762

0.00784

0.00378

0.00192

0.00105

BER: 4-split

0.30481

0.19797

0.10963

0.05366

0.02619

0.01286

0.00661

0.00361

0.00199

BER: 8-split

0.35271

0.24720

0.14913

0.08007

0.04251

0.02290

0.01239

0.00684

0.00384

BER: 16-split

0.38355

0.30474

0.20886

0.12644

0.07403

0.04192

0.02347

0.01334

0.00760

50

4.2.2 Encryption via Amplitude-Attenuation
Secondly, we try to use the channel fading amplitude-attenuation information
as the encryption key, since the instantaneous CSI contains both the phase-shifting
parameter and the amplitude-attenuation parameter. Based on Li’s phase-shifting
method, here we use the amplitude-attenuation to determine if we perform the interleaving or not (if the channel’s amplitude-attenuation were smaller than a
threshold, do the constellation interleaving; otherwise not.), as shown in Figure 44.

Figure 44: Split to 2 Parties by Amplitude-Attenuation
The simulation result is shown in Figure 45 and compared with the encrypted by the phase-shifting method.
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Figure 45: Encrypted by Amplitude-Attenuation vs. Encrypted by Phase-Shifting
It is evident that the amplitude-attenuation method has slightly worse but
similar performance as the phase-shifting method.

4.2.3 Reason Analysis
Besides Li’s paper, there are many papers which also exploit wireless signal
parameters to extract secret key [61]- [68] and these methods also suffer significant
performance loss. The main reason of this performance loss is caused by the quantization error which is introduced by the channel noise, as what T. Wang, etc. believed
[69].
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Take the example of the 2-split-phase-shifting shown in Figure 46, when the
Rayleigh fading vector R is close to the phase-trial-bound, the quantization error will
happen. For example, here the R is slightly larger than 0 degree, due to the noise
at the transmitter side the estimated phase
ceiver side the estimated phase
ceiving noise

,

is larger than 0 degree, but at the re-

is smaller than 0 degree with the different re-

. The phase-shifting estimation at the receiver side therefore falls in

the opposite area, and an error will happen. Encrypted by the amplitude-attenuation
method described in previous section also has the similar problem.

Figure 46: Trials near the Bound
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Table 2 and Table 3 show that with more phase slices, or more phase-trialbounds, the system performance became worse; the BER at the same SNR situation
are linearly increasing with the slices number, which also supports the above analysis.

4.3 New Method for Encryption by Channels Instantaneous CSI
Li’s method cannot yield a good result of the BER vs. SNR performance, but
the idea to use the instantaneous CSI information as the encryption key is perfect for
our wireless communication system.
As what we analyzed in above section 4.2.3, the trialing around the bounds
are Li’s method’s weak points. With the noises, the quantization of the key may jump
over the “hard bounds” to the wrong zone which can’t be avoided by this method.
Here we introduce a new method to avoid that kind of “hard bounds”:
1), Legitimate Receiver sends the pilot signal (un-encrypted);
2), Transmitter estimates the channel's fading with the pilot signal (unencrypted) from step 1);
3), Transmitter maps the data to the symbol of the constellation;
4), Transmitter checks the estimation result in step 2), then rotates the symbol with an angle of a mapping function ( ) where the is one of the channel
Instantaneous CSI parameters we have estimated in step 3);
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5), Transmitter sends the pilot signal (un-encrypted), and sends the symbol
in step 4);
6), Legitimate Receiver estimates the channel's fading with the pilot signal
(un-encrypted) from step 5);
7), Legitimate Receiver checks the estimation result in step 6), rotates the
symbol back an angle with the mapping function ( ) where

is the esti-

mated channel Instantaneous CSI at receiver side in step 6);
8), Legitimate Receiver decodes the data from step 7).
In this process, the channel instantaneous CSI parameters include the phaseshifting, and the amplitude-attenuation. The key point is that the mapping function
( ) must have a continuous first order derivative, so the function is smooth, without jumping point.

Figure 47: Trials with the New Method
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Using this new method, if the phase rotation error

is present due to the

channel noise, and if the error is in the range of the symbol trial bound, the error of
data will still not happen. For example, in Figure 47, with a BPSK modulation system,
at the transmitter side we send a symbol “1”; but due to the channel estimation error
between the transmitter and the receiver, the received symbol has 45 degree offset
after the phase-rotated-back. We can see that the data decoding error will not happen. By comparing the “hard bound” in Figure 46, here the error introduced by the
phase-rotation is “absorbed” by the symbol’s smooth function.
In this dissertation, to simplify the problem, we only analyze the case with mapping
function ( )

, where

denotes a constant.

The simulations in the following sections are based on this new technology.

4.4 Error Analysis for the New Method
4.4.1 Derivation: Un-encrypted Rayleigh Fading Channel
Analysis
Before we analyze the new method performance, here we derive the error of
the normal Rayleigh fading channel (traditional, un-encrypted channel).
From previous section (2.5 Rayleigh fading) we learned that the Rayleigh fading has the amplitude-attenuation which follows the Rayleigh distribution, and the
phase delay follows the uniform distribution.
( )

( )
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Based on the Rayleigh distribution properties, we let

√ which will not

change the signal’s statistical power, so we can perform the simulation with the appropriate SNR. To simplify the equation, we use

to express the Rayleigh

fading channel.
For both M-PSK and M-QAM modulation methods, the symbols in the constellations can be expressed as
Equation
12
where

denotes the symbol, and

,

denote the I (real), Q (imaginary) compo-

nents of the symbol, respectively.
For this complex signal, the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) is
(

)

(

)

(

)

Equation
13

The received signal can be expressed as:
(

Equation
14

)

The fading channel is estimated through the pilot symbol as
̂

(

)
Equation
15

(

)
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From above we know that the estimation of the channel fading has an error
which is caused by the channel AWGN noise. Also this error will be affected by the
amplitude of the pilot symbol, the higher amplitude, the lower the error. To take advantage of that, we always use one of the highest amplitude symbols in the constellation as the pilot symbol.

Also, the channel has constant Rayleigh fading parameter,

√ , as what we

assumed above. Therefore, at the high SNR situation, compared with |R|, the | | can
be omitted, or the R can be estimated precisely.
The received symbol can be extracted as
̂

̂
(

)

̂

[

(

)

(

)
(

(

]

)

)
Equation 16
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)
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)
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)

(

)
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)

( *(

)

+)
(

)

In above equation, (
signal ,

(

) denotes the downlink channel noise with the data

) denotes the downlink channel noise with the pilot signal, and

denotes the pilot signal for the downlink channel estimation ̂ .
(

: Here we assume those three
: Here the (
(

)

are exactly the same.

) is independent to the

(

) since the

) is the noise which comes with the pilot signal at the downlink

channel fading estimating stage, meanwhile (

) indicates the noise with

transmitted data.
: Since the (

) is independent to the

distributions, and both (

),

the uniform distribution in
(

(

(

), so
(

)

)

)

)
(

) as the Gaussian

) are complex numbers, both have

( *(

In the high SNR situation, the receiving error

(

(

)
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(

)

+).

can be approximated as

)

Equation
17

It’s in the format of a fraction with a zero mean Gaussian distribution over a
Rayleigh distribution.

4.4.2 Derivation: Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted by
the Channel Phase-Shifting
In the case where we encrypt the data by the channel phase-shifting, before
sending out the data, the transmitter rotates the symbols’ constellation by a function
( )

of the angle of the channel phase-shifting (

) which was estimated

by the transmitter.
(

Equation
18

)

Then at the receiver side, the Encrypted symbol will be decrypted as
̂

̂
(
(

[

(

Equation
19

)
)

)

(

)
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*

(

)

+

(

)
(
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(
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)
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)

)

(

(

)

)

(
(

)

(

)

)

) denotes the downlink channel noise, ̂ is the down-

In this equation, (

link channel estimation which is calculated from the real channel fading, the downlink channel noise

(

the same value as the

) and the downlink pilot signal

. The

should have

.

Also in this equation,

is the angle of the downlink channel phase-shifting

which was estimated by the receiver.
: Here we assume those three

(

)

are exactly the same. It is relat-

ed to the downlink channel estimation noise.
: Here the (
(

) is independent from the

(

) since the

) is the noise which comes with the pilot signal at the downlink

channel fading estimating stage while (

) comes with the signal symbol.

In the high SNR situation, the second part of the receiving errors,
approximated as
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, can be

(

(

)
(

(

)

(

)

)

(

)

)

(

)

(

)

Equation
20

The first part of the receiving errors
(

Equation
21

)

is related to the channel phase-shifting estimation error
(

Equation
22

)

between the transmitter side and receiver side. Figure 48 illustrates the scenario.

Figure 48: Channel Information Estimation Error
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In high SNR situation, the channel estimation at transmitter side (
be very close to the channel estimation at the receiver side (

) should

), then the differences

of the phase-shifting between transmitter side and receiver side

should also be

very small. In this case, it can be approximated as:
(

)

(

Equation
23

)

From Figure 48 we can obtain

(

(

)

)

(

)
Equation
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For the same reason,
(

(

(

)

)

)

(

)

(

)

(

)
Equation
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(

)

(

In above equation,

(

)

)

(

(

)

) denotes the uplink noise added to the pilot sig-

nal while the transmitter is estimating the channel parameters, and

63

(

) de-

notes the downlink noise added to the pilot signal while the receiver is estimating
the channel parameters.
Then for the total error estimation we have
(

(

)

(

)

)

(

(

)

Equation
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)

In this equation,
1)

is in uniform distribution, then (
(

we mark it as
2)

)

will be IID to

(

),

);

approaches to zero at high SNR situation, we will have
(

(

)

)

(

)

(

)

then
(

(

(

( *(

)

)

)

)

(

(

)

(

)
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(

)

(

)

)

(

)

+)

Equation
27

(

)

Compared with equation 17, the estimation error

in section 4.4.1 Un-

encrypted Rayleigh Fading Channel analysis, here the
format as the

also has the same

which is a fraction with a Gaussian distribution over a Rayleigh dis-

tribution. It indicates that this new encryption method by the channel phase-shifting
should have similar BER vs. SNR curve as the un-encrypted Rayleigh fading channel.
Also, the only difference between those two errors is in the deviation of the Gaussian
noise. We can expect that the BER vs. SNR curves of the encrypted system should be
parallel to the un-encrypted on if the Rayleigh fading channel parameters are the
same. In other words, there will be a constant BER/SNR performance gap between
the encrypted system and the un-encrypted system.
When

, equation 27 will reduce to equation 17, the un-encrypted chan-

nel situation.

4.4.3 Simulation Results of the Rayleigh Fading Channel
Encrypted by the Channel Phase-Shifting Parameter
In this section, we simulate the new encryption method by the phase-shifting
parameter of the Rayleigh fading channel. Same as previous simulations, the scale
√ . To simplify the problem, we set the

parameter of the Rayleigh distribution is
constant

in the phase rotation function ( ), and also assume the uplink has

the same downlink SNR at any given time (
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in value).

4.4.3.1 QPSK
Figure 49 shows the simulation results of the QPSK modulation. We can see
that the BER vs. SNR curve of the encrypted method is parallel to the un-encrypted
method at the Rayleigh fading channel with a few dB degradation, as what we predicted in section 4.4.2.

Figure 49: New Method Encrypted by Channel Phase-Shifting, QPSK
Table 4 lists some points of the curve pair in the Figure 49.
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Table 4: QPSK Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted by Channel
Phase-Shifting

SNR(dB)

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

SNR(dB)
BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

By zoom-in the above figure around SNR=50dB, we obtain Figure 50:

Figure 50: New Method Encrypted by Channel Phase-Shifting, QPSK, Enlarged
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Table 5: QPSK Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted by Channel
Phase-Shifting, Enlarged

SNR(dB)

45

46

47

48

49

50

BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

From Table 5, we can find that when the SNR = 50dB, the BER of the encrypted channel is

, which is between the performance of the un-encrypted

channel for

at SNR = 45dB to

at SNR =

46dB. In other words, the encrypted channel has about 4dB to 5dB loss compared
with the normal un-encrypted channel.
Recalling the QPSK constellation in the section 2.3.2 (all symbols have same
power), and the equation 27 in section 4.4.2 as below,

( *(

)

(

the modulation is the QPSK, then we have

(

)

|

)

+)

|, and with assumptions

,

in this simulation, then
(

(

( )

)
Equation
28

)

which means the equivalent noise power is

.

From equation 17, the un-encrypted channel error is
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( *(

)

+)
Equation
29

(

)

which means the equivalent noise power is

.

Comparing equation 28 and equation 29, the equivalent noise of the encrypted channel is 3 times to, or 4.77dB worse than that of the un-encrypted channel.
The simulation results are fairly close to the theoretical prediction.

4.4.3.2 16-QAM
Figure 51 shows the simulation results of the 16-QAM modulation.

Figure 51: New Method Encrypted by Channel Phase-Shifting, 16-QAM
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Table 6 lists some points of the curve pair in Figure 51.

Table 6: 16-QAM performance in Rayleigh fading channel encrypted by Channel
Phase-Shifting

SNR(dB)

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

SNR(dB)
BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

By enlarging the right-down corner of above figure, we have Figure 52:

Figure 52: New Method Encrypted by Channel Phase-Shifting, 16-QAM, Enlarged
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Table 7: 16-QAM Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted by Channel
Phase-Shifting, Enlarged

SNR(dB)

45

46

47

48

49

50

BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

From Table 7, we can find that when SNR = 50dB, the BER of the encrypted
channel is

, which is close to the performance of the un-encrypted

channel at SNR =47dB. In other words, the encrypted channel has about 3dB degradation compared with the normal un-encrypted channel.

Recall the 16QAM constellation in the section 2.3.4 as above, and the equation 27
in section 4.4.2 as below,
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)

(

(

)

)

+)

the modulation is the 16QAM, the average power of the symbols in the constellation
is normalized to
power |

|

, and we choose the pilot symbol as

, and with the assumptions

,

which has

√

in this simulation.

For different symbols in the constellation, they have different symbol powers and
possibilities.
For

, it has the possibility of appearing as , and here the Signal-

Noise-Ratio becomes (

(

)

;
(

( *

)

( *

( *

+)

+)

, it has the possibility of appearing as , (

for

(

) +)

)

)

(

( *

( *

+)
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;

) +)

( *

+)

, it has a possibility of appearing as , (
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(

(

( [

)

( *

( *

)

;

) ])

+)

+)

then
( *

+)

( *

+)

( *

+)

For different symbols in the constellation, the noises are independent, so
( *

(

+

*

+

*

+)
Equation
30

)

which means that the equivalent noise power is

.

Similarly, from equation 16, the un-encrypted channel error is

( *(
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)

)
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;
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Equation
31

)

which means that the equivalent noise power is
Comparing equation 30 and equation 31, the equivalent noise of the encrypted channel is 2.034 times to, or 3.08dB worse than the un-encrypted channel.
The simulation results also closely match the theoretical prediction.

4.4.3.3 Efficiency of new Encryption Method to Anti-eavesdropping:
by Phase-Shifting
In above two sections we have simulated the SNR-BER performances of the
encrypted by the Rayleigh channel’s instantaneous CSI parameter – phase-shifting
with QPSK modulation system and 16-QAM modulation system respectively, which
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has proved that this new method is excellent at the legitimate receiver side with nice
SNR-BER performance.
In this section, we simulate the SNR-BER performances at the eavesdropper
side.
Figure 53 shows the BER vs. SNR performance of the eavesdropper side in
the Rayleigh channel which is encrypted by the phase-shifting of the channel, with
QPSK modulation.

Figure 53: Eavesdropper Performance in the Encrypted Rayleigh Channel, by
Phase-Shifting, QPSK.
Above simulation results confirm that this method is perfect for antieavesdropping purposes – the BER of the eavesdropper is at 50 percent regardless
of the SNR.
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Figure 54 shows the BER vs. SNR performance of the eavesdropper side in
the Rayleigh channel which is encrypted by the phase-shifting of the channel, with
16-QAM modulation.

Figure 54: Eavesdropper Performance in the Encrypted Rayleigh Channel, by
Phase-Shifting, 16-QAM.
Above simulation results confirm that this method has excellent antieavesdropping capability: the BER is at about 40 percent although not perfect as 50
percent. In Figure 55 we add the SER vs. SNR performance at the eavesdropper side
to the simulation results.
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Figure 55: Eavesdropper BER/SER Performance in the Encrypted Rayleigh Channel, by Phase-Shifting. 16-QAM
Although the BER at the eavesdropper side is about 40 percent, above figure
shows that the SER is still above 80 percent regardless of the SNR. The reason is that
for the 16-QAM we applied the Gray coding for the constellation, as mentioned in the
section 2.3.4. The Gray coding can reduce the bit-error-ratio; however in our constellation the bit ‘0’ and bit ‘1’ are not evenly distributed in the constellation with the
amplitude of the symbols, as Figure 56 shows.
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Figure 56: The 16-QAM Constellation and the Received Symbols at the Eavesdropper Side, SNR=50dB. Rayleigh Channel, Encrypted by Phase-Shifting Parameter

4.4.4.4 Other Modulations
In this section, we list the simulation results of BER/SNR performances of the
BPSK modulation, the 8PSK modulation, and the 64-QAM modulation systems.

Figure 57: BPSK System Performances in Rayleigh Fading Channel, Encrypted by
Phase-Shifting
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Figure 58: 8PSK System Performances in Rayleigh Fading Channel, Encrypted by
Phase-Shifting

Figure 59: 64-QAM System Performances in Rayleigh Fading Channel, Encrypted
by Phase-Shifting
79

Similar as the 16-QAM constellation, we applied the Gray Code to the 64-QAM
constellation, as what we mentioned in section 2.3.5.
From above Figures 57 to 59, we can see that all those modulation systems
have similar performances as what we have observed in QPSK and 16QAM modulation systems.

4.4.4 Derivation: Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted by
the Channel Amplitude-Attenuation
In this section, we analyze the performance of the new encryption method
with the channel instantaneous CSI amplitude-attenuation. Before the data is sent
out, the transmitter should rotate the symbol constellation by the angle based on the
( )

function

where the

is the channel amplitude-attenuation.

At the receiver side, the symbol becomes
(

Equation
32

)

which is similar to equation 18 in the 4.4.2 section.
Similarly, the Encrypted symbol will be decrypted as
̂

Equation
33

̂
(
(

)
)
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Recall the Figure 48 as below,
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. Here both

)| are half-normal distribution [70]. The
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|

(

)|

|

where

(

)| follows a normal distribution as
(

Obviously the measured error

(

)

), see Appendix 1.
is following a Gaussian distribution. We

knew that at high SNR situation, the AWGN channel has much better performance
than the Rayleigh channel. In other words, at a high SNR situation, the error
be ignored compared with the error

can

, and we can expect that the channel encrypt-

ed by this amplitude-attenuation method should have the same BER performance as
the un-encrypted channel at high SNR scenario.

4.4.5 Simulation Results of the Rayleigh Fading Channel
Encrypted by the Channel Amplitude-Attenuation Parameter
In this section, we simulate the new encryption method by the amplitudeattenuation parameter of the Rayleigh fading channel. Same as the previous simulations, the scale parameter of the Rayleigh distribution is
problem, we set the constant

√ . To simplify the

in the phase rotation function ( ), and also as-

sume the uplink has the same downlink SNR at any given time (

in value).

4.4.5.1 QPSK
Figure 60 shows the simulation results of the QPSK modulation, encrypted by
the amplitude-attenuation. The parameter settings are mentioned in previous sec-
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tion. Obviously, the encrypted method overlaps with the un-encrypted method in
the Rayleigh fading channel at high SNR situation.

Figure 60: New Method Encrypted by Channel Amplitude-Attenuation, QPSK
Table 8 lists some points of the curve pair in Figure 60.

Table 8: QPSK Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted by Channel
Amplitude-Attenuation

SNR(dB)

5

10

15

BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted
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20

25

SNR(dB)

30

35

40

45

50

BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

Zooming in to the SNR=25dB part, we have Figure 61:

Figure 61: New Method Encrypted by Channel Amplitude-Attenuation, QPSK, Enlarged
Table 9 lists some points of the curve pair in Figure 61.

Table 9: QPSK Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted by Channel
Amplitude-Attenuation, Enlarged

SNR(dB)

25

26

27

85

28

29

30

BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

From Table 9, we can find that the difference between the BERs of normal
channel and encrypted channel while SNR=29dB is
0.6 percent compared with

, which is lease than

.

4.4.5.2 16-QAM
Figure 62 shows the simulation results of the 16-QAM modulation, encrypted
by the amplitude-attenuation. The parameter settings are the same as previous simulation. This figure also has confirmed the results in the QPSK modulation simulation in previous section.

Figure 62: New Method Encrypted by Channel Amplitude-Attenuation, 16-QAM
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Table 10 lists some points of the curve pair in the Figure 62.

Table 10: 16-QAM Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted by Channel
Amplitude-Attenuation

SNR(dB)

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

SNR(dB)
BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

Zooming in to the SNR=28dB part, we have Figure 63:

Figure 63: New Method Encrypted by Channel Amplitude-Attenuation, 16-QAM,
Enlarged
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Table 11: 16-QAM Performance in Rayleigh Fading Channel Encrypted by Channel
Amplitude-Attenuation, Enlarged

SNR(dB)

26

27

28

29

30

31

BER: Normal
BER: Encrypted

From Table 11, we can find that the difference between the BERs of normal
channel and encrypted channel where SNR=30dB is
0.6 percent compared with

, which is lease than

.

4.4.5.3 Efficiency of this Encryption Method to Anti-Eavesdropping:
by Amplitude-Attenuation
In above two sections we simulated the SNR-BER performances of the encrypted by the Rayleigh channel’s instantaneous CSI parameter – amplitudeattenuation with QPSK and 16-QAM respectively, which proved that our new method is excellent to apply at the legitimate receiver side with great BER-SNR performance.
Now we check the encryption performance at the eavesdropper side.
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Figure 64: Eavesdropper Performance in the Encrypted Rayleigh Channel, by Amplitude-Attenuation. QPSK.

Figure 65: Eavesdropper BER/SER Performance in the Encrypted Rayleigh Channel, by Amplitude-Attenuation, 16-QAM.
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Figure 64 shows the BER vs. SNR performance at the eavesdropper side in
the Rayleigh channel which system is encrypted by the phase-shifting of the channel,
modulated by QPSK; similarly, Figure 65 shows the BER/SER vs. SNR performance
of eavesdropper side in the 16QAM modulation system.
In Figure 64, we find that for the QPSK, the BER at the eavesdropper side is at
about 25 percent. Recalling Figure 53 which has 50 percent BER at the eavesdropper
side, both simulations in Figure 53 and 64 are using the same QPSK modulation constellation; the only difference is the encryption parameter. In the method encrypting
by the phase-shifting, the phase-shifting is following the uniform distribution in
), so the BER equal to 0.5 at the eavesdropper side is what we expected. In the
method encrypting by the amplitude-attenuation, the amplitude-attenuation is following the Rayleigh distribution. Recalling section 2.5, the PDF of the Rayleigh distribution has the following shape as Figure 19,
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the Rayleigh distribution has the mean at √ . Obviously, its characteristic values
will cause an offset of the BER/SNR at the eavesdropper side away from 0.5.
Figure 65 also shows that the BER (about 30 percent, SNR = 50dB) at the
eavesdropper side is lower than the results in Figure 54 (BER is about 40 percent),
which has same modulation (16-QAM), but is encrypted by the channel’s phaseshifting.
Figure 66 plots the received symbols at the eavesdropper side of the 16-QAM
modulation system. We can find some clusters on those circles, which haven’t been
found in Figure 56. It means that encrypting by the channel amplitude-attenuation is
not as good as by the channel phase-shifting in the sense of encryption.
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Figure 66: 16-QAM Constellation. Received Symbols at the Eavesdropper Side,
SNR=50dB. Rayleigh Channel, Encrypted by Amplitude-Attenuation Parameter
The SER vs. SNR with 16-QAM modulation at the eavesdropper side showed
in the Figure 65 (close to 80 percent while SNR = 50dB) is slightly lower than in the
Figure 55 (close to 90 percent while SNR = 50dB), which is also caused by the patterns.
By changing the constant

in the equation ( )

, we can have a differ-

ent constellation of the received symbols at the eavesdropper side. Figure 67 shows
the received symbols constellation at the eavesdropper side with

instead of

in Figure 66, and Figure 68 is the correlated BER/SER vs. SNR curves.

Figure 67: 16-QAM Constellation. Received Symbols at the Eavesdropper Side,
SNR=50dB. Rayleigh Channel, Encrypted by Amplitude-Attenuation Parameter
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Figure 68: Eavesdropper BER/SER Performance in the Encrypted Rayleigh Channel, by Amplitude-Attenuation. 16-QAM.
From Figure 67, the amplitude-attenuation pattern is blurry, which means
the encryption performance has been recovered, as the red-dot curve and the bluestar curve in Figure 68. However, the BER vs. SNR performance at the legitimate receiver side is also degraded when the SNR is low as the pink-star cure in Figure 68.

4.4.5.4 Other Modulations
In this section, we list the simulation results of the BPSK, the 8PSK, and the
64-QAM modulations with

, as the figures from 69 to 71, respectively.

All those figures have shown similar performances as the QPSK modulation,
or 16-QAM modulation we have discussed in previous sections.
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Figure 69: BPSK System Performances in Rayleigh Fading Channel, Encrypted by
Amplitude-Attenuation
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Figure 70: 8PSK System Performances in Rayleigh Fading Channel, Encrypted by
Amplitude-Attenuation

Figure 71: 64-QAM System Performances in Rayleigh Fading Channel, Encrypted
by Amplitude-Attenuation

4.5 Summary of the Encryption by Wireless Channel
Instantaneous CSI
From the discussions, derivations, and simulations in this chapter, we can conclude that the encryption by the wireless channel instantaneous CSI is an effective method for encryption and wireless transmission with appropriate mapping functions and parameters. Through the new method in our proposal, the system performances at the legitimate receiver side are close to the un-encrypted system performances, which indicate
this new method can be applied to wireless communication system with little to none performance loss.
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The new encryption method by the phase-shifting of the wireless channel instantaneous CSI has the ideal encryption performance at the eavesdropper side, but has a few
dBs of performance degradation compared with the un-encrypted channel.
The new encryption method by the amplitude-attenuation of the wireless channel
instantaneous CSI has the ideal BER vs. SNR performance at the legitimate receiver side,
but not perfect about encryption due to the pattern of the Rayleigh fading. We can change
the parameters in the phase-rotation function to enforce the encryption performance at the
eavesdropper side, but also will degrade the system performance at the legitimate receiver
side.
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5. CONCLUSIONS

In this dissertation we have introduced a series of new technologies to enhance the
security of cognitive radio networks.

5.1 The PU Characteristics
For this part, we have introduced the underlay signal hidden inside the header part
of the PU’s data frame, using a deliberately introduced underlay signal’s symbol rate as
the PU characteristics.
As the first level of identification, it meets the following requirements:
1) The PU characteristics are always present whenever the PU is online;
2) It does not require extra bandwidth for transmitting this characteristic;
3) It’s transparent to the receiver in the PU’s sub-network, which will not affect
the communication protocol;
4) It does not degrade the PU sub-network’s communication SNR and performance;
5) It can be configured by the identification center;
6) It can be extracted by the identification center, but too complex for most mobile
terminals to perform such operation.
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Obviously, this undelay-signal design imposes minimal change and influence to
the PU system, and is capable of eliminating most potential mobile intruders.

5.2 The Anti-Eavesdropping
The second level identification requires a wireless communication between the authentication center and the spectrum user. This communication needs to be highly encrypted, and meanwhile maintaining a great wireless BER/SNR performance.
The new encryption method introduced by us via the instantaneous channel information has the following properties:
1) Keyless. There is no need to switch the key during the encrypted communication.
2) Random code. The channel parameters which mapped to encrypt the signal
symbols are fully random.
3) Infinite length code. The channel parameters are changing with time, endlessly.
4) Can’t be access by any third party.
5) Excellent BER/SNR performance.
6) Simple and elegant algorithm.
From above summary, it is evident that this new encryption method is an excellent
candidate for high security cognitive radio network against eavesdropping.
In conclusion, with the underlay signal in header as the PU characteristics, and
with the encrypted authentication with the instantaneous channel information, the pro-
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posed schemes have the capability of enhancing the security of cognitive radio network
significantly.

5.2.1 Other Applications
The keyless-encryption method we mentioned in above section is applicable
to many areas. For example, it can be applied to the home Wi-Fi system to prevent
the login key stealing, it can also be applied to the cell phone communication system
for wireless online pay, it can be applied to the car’s remote key system, and also it
can be applied to the military communication in the battlefield.

5.3 Future Research Directions
In chapter 4, we only analyzed the phase-rotation-function ( )

with

, and we assumed that the up-link has the same noise pattern as the down-link.
In our future research, we can analyze
1) Other phase-rotation-functions,
2) Different parameters
to enhance system performances (both encryption at the eavesdropper side and
BER/SNR at the legitimate receiver side).
For the system encrypted by the channel phase-shifting, it has a constant SNR
degradation compared to the un-encrypted channel. We need to study more functions to reduce, or even eliminate the degradation.
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For the system encrypted by the channel amplitude-attenuation, we need to
study deeper to remove the cluster pattern on the received constellation at the
eavesdropper side.
Also we can study the encryption method combining both the channel phaseshifting and the channel amplitude-attenuation, which may bring better results.
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